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Critical approaches


Definitions

Social structure – 'entities or groups in definite relation to each other ... relatively enduring patterns of behaviour and relationship within social systems that shape the behaviour of actors within social systems ... institutionalised norms or cognitive frameworks that structure the actions of actors in the social system' (Wikipedia, 2007).

Absolutism – the doctrine of an absolute or non relative reality that is independent of or unconditioned by anything outside itself.

Relativism – the rejection of the view that there are universal truths about the world based on its essential characteristics. There are only interpretations of the world.

Idealism – the metaphysical view that all reality consists of mind and its ideas.

Scientific realism – the view that the subject matter of scientific research and scientific theory exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that the goal of scientific research is to describe and explain both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. Scientific realism holds that there are knowable, mind-independent facts, objects, or properties.

Critical realism – like scientific realism, except it raises its claims within the social sciences.

Anti-realism – rejects the view that there are knowable mind-independent facts, objects, or properties.

Empiricism – understood in contrast to scientific or critical realism. Empiricism is the view that knowledge of the world is limited to what can be observed. For instance, concepts apply to or derive from an experience – the concept of dizziness applies to the experience of dizziness. The experience must have evoked the concept, or the person must recognise that the concept applies to the experience. Also, beliefs about the world have truth merit only when they are related to someone’s experience.

Capitalism –  an economic system in which the means of production are privately owned and operated for profit, and in which the distribution, production and pricing of goods and services is determined within a free market.

Text – any interpreted experience including written words, conversation, pictures, film, architecture, a piece of art, or a social event.

Introduction

This topic explores critical approaches that have been influenced by the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar and the Western European Marxist tradition. Critical Theory, when capitalised, is associated with thinkers from the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas), a group of German scholars interpreting Marxist thought in the 1920s.  This topic will also consider the influence of hermeneutics upon the development of the Frankfurt School and contemporary Critical Theory.

It is important to remember that the term critical theory, particularly when it appears with a small 'c', is sometimes used to refer to critiques that are influenced by a broader range of theoretical influences than Critical Theory and critical realism including phenomenology, structuralism, poststructuralism, psychoanalytic theory, feminism, Marxism, and hermeneutics. In this topic, we are concerned with Critical theory with a big 'C'.

Critical realism and Critical Theory share many aspects in common with the interpretive approaches summarised in the last topic, perhaps most notably a critique of positivism, but they also disagree in important ways. Like positivism, critical realism and Critical Theory claim to offer a 'scientific' approach to the study of society, and like the interpretive approaches we looked at in the last topic they accept that social, historical and cultural conditions shape knowledge and experience. However, they aim to avoid both the absolutism of positivism and the relativism of interpretivism by offering knowledge about socially constituted structures or mechanisms, upon which to build social action and political change. 

Perhaps the simplest way to understand what is distinctive about Critical Theory is to begin with the concept of social structure. Within Critical Theory, social structures are understood as the relationships that exist between stratified social groups, for example groups based on gender, race, class, ethnicity, or religion. Social structures determine individual, organisational and social behaviour and outcomes, but they are also shaped by the actions of individuals, groups and organisations. Critical Theory aims to offer a scientific analysis of 'real' social structures, but the methodological or philosophical basis for its knowledge claims are distinctive from both positivism and interpretivism.

For Critical Theory, social structures are objectively real, but they cannot be theorised in the same way that positivism theorises objective reality because, for Critical Theory, social structures are understood to change from one society to another, and from one time period to another. Critical Theory rejects the positivist view that the social world is composed of fundamental natural laws just like the natural world, and insists on understanding social processes within their cultural and historical circumstances.

On the other hand, Critical Theory rejects the empiricist view, within both positivism and interpretivism, that knowledge of the world can only be gained through direct observation or experience. For Critical Theorists, social structures exist independently of our knowledge of them, and they can be theorised independently of direct experience. In other words, we do not need to see or hear social structures in order to be confident they exist.

Critical realism and Critical Theory reject the relativism and idealism within interpretivism. Critical Theory argues that interpretivism produces localised, isolated and temporally specific knowledge in which all points of view are seen to be equally valid (Neuman, 2000:76). It also claims that interpretivism places too much emphasis upon people's ideas, and too little upon the deeper, more enduring social structures that precede, shape and delimit events and experience. In this sense, interpretivism is seen to be just as at risk as positivism of uncritically reproducing the social order, including its oppressive aspects.

The process via which researchers can distinguish between 'real' and 'subjective', 'distorted' or 'ideological' orders of existence is distinctive within Critical Theory. Positivism attempts to validate its claims with reference to empirical data taken to reflect 'objective reality'. Interpretivism sees consciousness or human beings as the ultimate origin of 'meaningful' social exchange. In this topic we will see that for Critical Theory it is rational dialogue or communication that validates the knowledge produced by a critical social science.

Critical realism

From Blaikie, N 1993, Approaches to social enquiry, Polity Press, Cambridge, pages 58-62.

  1. The foremost proponent of critical realism is the Brittish philopospher Roy Bhaskar (b1944).
  2. Realists agree with interpretivism that the social world is mediated by social relations, is qualitatively different from the observable natural world, and must therefore be studied in a different way.
  3. Realism also agrees with interpretivism that the social world is pre-interpreted. It is socially produced and reproduced. It is both a condition and an outcome of social processes.
  4. However, Bhaskar sees an important distinction between the meaning of actions and the personal beliefs, intentions or motives of subjects such that an interpretive inquiry into the subject's own perceptions will not necessarily yield a correct reading of events.
  5. Bhaskar also believes that it is possible to describe and explain unobservable aspects of the world, thereby rejecting the empiricist view that knowledge can only be obtained via sense experience.
  6. This conception flows from Bhaskar's layered conceptualisation of reality. 
  7. Reality, for critical realists, comprises three elements: the empirical, the actual and the real. The empirical pertains to what is observed. The actual pertains to events, whether or not they are observed. The real consists of the underlying structures or mechanisms that constitute and produce events.
  8. Real structures or mechanisms, for Bhaskar, exist independently of our observations of them. That is, they exist whether we observe them or not.
  9. Although not always observable in terms of their effects, these structures can generate observable events, or cause manifest phenomenon.
  10. Critical realism aims to explain phenomenon by revealing the underlying structures and mechanisms that cause them.
  11. Interpretivism is seen to entail an unnecessary relativism in which nothing can be said to exist beyond interpretation. Interpretivism is also criticised because it fails to shed light on the underlying structures or mechanisms that shape the social context and subjective experience.
  12. Positivism is seen to entail an unnecessary absolutism in which observable data are assumed to reveal universal laws.
  13. For critical realism, causality operates as a tendency or pattern, rather than as an absolute law that determines the relationship between events as for positivism. The causal power of structural laws depends upon context or conditions. Structures are not always predictable, but arise from the specific social forces within a given time period and cultural context.
  14. Realism must therefore theorise about possible relations or tendencies between social events or phenomenon, and then seek empirical evidence to establish whether the relationship exists. It cannot simply collect empirical data, as positivism does, based on the assumption that a universal law is being observed because ahistorical laws simply do not exist for realists. The mechanisms that cause social events and phenomena are understood to be relative and changeable.

Critical Theory has been influenced by critical realism and shares many of its conclusions, although it is more directly associated with influences from Marxism and hermeneutics. These will be discussed in turn below.

Karl Marx

From Crotty, M 1998, The Foundations of Social Research, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, chapter 6.

In epistemological and theoretical terms Critical Theory is very different from the work of Karl Marx (1818-1883). However, Marx’s work has been extremely influential on the direction of social thought in general, including that of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory.

Some of the central tenets of Marx’s thought:

  1. Dialectical materialism (historical materialism) – societies are composed of inner contradictions that drive historical transformation (influenced by Hegel’s dialectic).
  2. Economic determinism – the means and forces of production (developments in the technological mode of subsistence) determine social relations of production.
  3. ‘Superstructure’ – legal, political and cultural forms are built upon the ‘real foundation’ of the economic base.
  4. Ideology – the production and distribution of ideas by those who are economically dominant.
  5. ‘False consciousness’ – accepting values and norms generated by the ruling elite that do not represent things as they really are.
  6. Marxist ontology – an understanding of human beings as productive in their very nature. Work is seen to express who we are and to fulfil us.
  7. Alienation (becoming a stranger to oneself) – within capitalism labour and its products become alien to us because they are owned by someone else. We no longer know ourselves, or find fulfilment in our labour.
  8. Proletarian revolution – in which workers must revolutionise society in order to restore humanity.

The Frankfurt School of thought first emerges in the debates of the 1920s after Marx’s death. It has been strongly influenced by phenomenology and hermeneutics and emphasises culture as distinct from economics while retaining Marx’s emphasis upon social change and activism.

Hermeneutics

From Crotty, M 1998, The foundations of social research, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, chapter 5.

  1. Hermeneutics originates in biblical studies, and refers to the practice of interpreting obscure or symbolic biblical texts in order to unearth their hidden meaning. The term now includes scholarly ‘readings’ of non scriptural texts, practices, events, and situations, and is driven by a concern to understand cultures or historical periods that are different from our own (Blaikie, 1993:29).
  2. Hermeneutics introduces a critical emphasis on language as central to human life and experience – language shapes us and our world (rather than humans or the world shaping language).
  3. It inherits from its past life as scriptural interpretation a tendency to mine texts for deeper significance, and to explain how texts can or should be applied (so not just a matter of abstract theorising, but also of common sense).
  4. There is an attempt to explain or make intelligible something that is in some way hidden, indirect, strange, separated in time or place, or outside experience.
  5. Hermeneutics holds that we can only understand and articulate ourselves as culturally and historically located beings – speech, writing, art, behaviour, law, institutions, and therefore experience itself, are all products of time and place.
  6. Hermeneutics attempts to gain an understanding of the text that goes beyond the author’s understanding or ability to articulate; authors bring implicit meanings and intentions that they do not themselves recognise.
  7. There is a consistent theme of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ in which ideas and terms that explain a phenomenon must be incorporated in understanding it. Each part relates to the overall meaning of the text and must be read in relation to the whole, and the whole must in turn be read in relation to the parts. It is a cyclical or gradual process in which one piece of information comes at a time and influences how you understand the object until it gradually comes into focus. The interpreter moves from the text to the social world of the author bringing to life that world and the meaning of the text within it.

Heidegger’s hermeneutic existentialism:

  1. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) paved the way for hermeneutics in his early work.
  2. Heidegger was critical of philosophies of subjectivity from Descartes onward which envisaged a separate, self-aware entity that experiences and knows the world. He argued that received versions of the subject do not describe a naturally occurring thing, but are a product of historical thought and fail to consider fundamental questions about the nature of existence itself (Mansfield, 2000:22-23).
  3. Heidegger offers a conceptualisation of subjectivity as fundamentally based upon a state of ‘being’, ‘presence’ or ‘pre-understanding’ that is more fundamental than our interpretation of experience. This state of being, or Dasein, is overlaid by the social, cultural, and historical understandings that we immediately reach for.
  4. Heidegger also rejected the received view that subjective experience or consciousness is enclosed within an interior space that is separate from the exterior objective world. For Heidegger, Dasein is in the world and belongs to it. The world conditions our experience and the context within which we live (Mansfield, 2000:22-23).
  5. For Heidegger, the interpreter must return to, or move from this ‘primordial’ state of consciousness in order to make explicit what is implicit or unthematised in our experience. From this position, he argued, we can begin to observe and understand our experience and the world in a way that is truly reflective and meaningful, avoiding the trap of simply reproducing received versions of events.

Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics:

  1. For Hans-Georg Gadamer (b1900) the interpreter can hope to understand the past because we are ourselves embedded in the past – human beings stand in traditions, and traditions exist within language. ‘Tradition is not an object of historical knowledge, but part of one’s very being’ (Audi, 1999:338).
  2. The trick for the interpreter is to filter out ‘local and limited prejudice’ and individual viewpoint in order to form a genuine understanding of developments or changes in historical tradition. (It is almost as though the interpreter historian is looking for what is truly historical within themselves and in the present in order to understand significant developments in the past).
  3. So historical hermeneutics doesn’t offer an objective essence of what ‘really happened’ so much as a history of changes or developments in human traditions that are understood to be uniform, coherent and at the core of human consciousness and experience.

Critical Theory

From Crotty, M 1998, The foundations of social research, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, chapter 5.

Horkheimer

  1. Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) was the first director of the Frankfurt School.
  2. He was concerned with a split within German research between the vitalism of direct experience and the rigour of empirical research. He sought a melding of philosophy and science that could capture and theorise the lived reality of social life, rather than simply reproduce fragmented ideological accounts – a critical theory of the social order. This led to an interdisciplinary program of research in which philosophical theory was tested against empirical evidence.
  3. The early Critical Theorists Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) and Max Horkheimer called for a 'critical tribunal' based on the capacity of human beings to reason. They believed that human beings are capable of acting autonomously to create and control their lives in the pursuit of meaningful pleasures so long as they are free of relations of social domination. The capacity to reason was seen as fundamental to our ability to critique the irrationalism of capitalist society which produces false needs and wants while failing to meet our real needs and wants (Blaikie, 1993:52).
  4. Critical Theory challenges positivism's denial of the scientific validity of critical reason (for positivists reason falls outside experiential knowledge and is not therefore accepted as a basis of knoweldge) (Blaikie, 1993:52).

Adorno

  1. Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) became a member of the Frankfurt School in 1938.
  2. Adorno was a musical composer and musicologist and combined his interest in philosophy with aesthetics.
  3. He worked closely with Horkheimer and led the latter away from the empirical side of his social theory towards a more social philosophical bent.
  4. We see the critical phenomenological and hermeneutic flavour of Adorno’s ideas in his insistence upon the domination and oppressiveness of concepts, and their inability to capture the fullness and richness of the things they represent.
  5. For Adorno, knowledge acquisition involves a process in which we utilise pre-existing concepts in order to identify and classify realities into manageable totalities, but in doing so we lose many precious differences.
  6. Instead, Adorno advocates a 'dialectical', 'nonidentical', 'mimetic' or 'aesthetic' cognition in which analogy and similitude are exchanged for conceptual definition. This allows us to see the resemblances between concepts and things, but also to multiply the differences between them. Concepts are used 'non-conceptually' to tentatively suggests a reading that does not fix our perception.
  7. Mimetic cognition then becomes a model for human conduct and for social organisation. Adorno challenges the assumption that we are each of us unique, pre-social individuals who must conceptualise the objects of our experience in order to express our genuineness, as some expressions of social constructionism and phenomenology would have it. Rather, for Adorno, the individual self is given to us by society so that, in a sense, the greater our engagement with social forms the more genuine we become.
  8. In this move, Adorno turns the fear of imitation within broader aesthetic discourse into a virtue by arguing we should enter into mimetic consciousness in which we utilise or mimic existing concepts to understand our experience without accepting that concepts ever fully capture that experience for us. 
  9. This kind of mimetic conduct renders our experiences a 'constellation' or 'trial arrangement' that is always shifting and incomplete, a creative unfolding in which concepts are never allowed to fix our identity or experience. It is an aesthetics of existence.
  10. For Adorno, this aestethics of existence or 'immanent criticism' rejects the power of concepts to define consciousness and reality and opens the path to social and historical change. It offers us the means by which we can resist the forms of social domination that depend upon an acceptance of the pre-existing concepts that fix our sense of what is real, disallowing the objects of our perception to continually unfold within specific contexts, and to suggest to us new lines of action.
  11. Despite the emphasis on philosophy, Adorno did not then retreat from the Marxist insistence on social change. His concern with consciousness and with art arises from his sense of the need for a more revolutionary consciousness among the proletariat, and a more subversive role for art.

Habermas

From Blaikie, N 1993, Approaches to social enquiry, Polity Press, Cambridge, pages 52-58.

  1. Jurgen Habermas (b 1929) is a leading contemporary exponent of Critical Theory.
  2. He joined the Frankfurt School in the mid 1950s as Adorno's research assistant.
  3. Habermas agrees with interpretivism that 'reality' is already pre-interpreted, or only meaningful within specific existing cultural and historical contexts. Knowledge produced by the natural sciences is therefore imbued with taken-for-granted cultural assumptions, and is not objective as it claims.
  4. Habermas introduces the concept of 'interest', 'cognitive interests' or 'knowledge-constitutive interests'. 'Interests' guide people in how they constitute reality and organise their experience. These interests determine what can count as an object of knowledge, as well as the methods that can be used to produce and justify what counts as knowledge.
  5. Habermas offers a threefold typology for the interests that shape human knowledge. The empirical-analytic sciences, including both the natural sciences and the social sciences, aim to exploit knowledge for the purposes of prediction, control and domination over nature and social relations. The historical-hermeneutic, or cultural or human sciences, aim to understand communication within and between social groups. The third, critical theory, aims for emancipation from the relations of domination within social relations. In each approach, the researcher's interests are different and shape how reality is viewed – as something that can be explained in causal terms, in the first, or understood as a communication system, in the second.
  6. For Habermas, Critical Theory involves all three kinds of knowledge and uses the methods of both the empirical-analytic sciences, and the historical-hermeneutic sciences, as well as its own form of knowledge production.
  7. The truth of a critique within Critical Theory is established not by observation, as for the empirical-analytic sciences, but via critical reason and open dialogue. This depends upon 'ideal speech situations' in which participants are free to question or refute the claims of other speakers. Within these contexts 'rational consensus' emerges because, so the approach reasons, rational people who are free of the pressures of social distortion and constraint, will inevitably find agreement.
  8. The truth that emerges within Critical Theory is understood in normative rather than absolute terms – it is grounded in the structure of social action and language.
  9. In this way Critical Theorists attempt to avoid the problems associated with skepticism and relativism. The knowledge produced by Critical Theory is seen to utilise, but transcend the status of the empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic sciences in that it offers knowledge subjected to rigorous processes of free and rational discourse, and therefore free of social distortion. 

Common threads within contemporary Critical Theory:

  1. Critical Theory accepts that knowledge is subjective (historically and culturally embedded) and constructed on the basis of issues of power (Lather, 2006:38).
  2. Critical Theory sees discourse as controlled and produced within and by rhetorical and political interests (Lather, 2006:38).
  3. There is the view that the relationship between concept and object, and between signifier and signified, is never stable and is often mediated by the social relations of capitalist production and consumption.
  4. Language is understood to be central to the formation of subjectivity, that is, both conscious and unconscious awareness.
  5. Certain groups in society are privileged over others, constituting an oppression that is most forceful when subordinates accept their social status as natural, necessary or inevitable.
  6. Oppression has many faces, and concern for only one form of oppression at the expense of others can be counterproductive because of the connections between them (gender, class, race).
  7. Mainstream research practices are generally implicated, albeit often unwittingly, in the reproduction of systems of class, race and gender oppression’ (Crotty, 1993:157-158).
  8. Emancipatory knowledge reveals the contradictions that are hidden or distorted by our everyday understandings, and thereby suggests the way to social transformation (Lather, 1986:259).

Some well known contemporary critical theorists

From Morrow, R A 1994, Critical theory and methodology: Contemporary social theory, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, p.17.

Zygmunt Bauman, David Held, John Keane, William Outhwaite, John B. Thompson, Ben Agger, Robert Antonio, Andrew Arato, Stanley Aronowitz, Seyla Benhabib, Richard Bernstein, Norman Birnbaum, Craig Calhoun, Jean Cohen, Fred Dallmayr, Nancy Fraser, Henry Giroux, Alvin Gouldner, Martin Jay, Douglas Kellner, Tim Luke, Tom McCarthy, Paul Piccone, Mark Poster, Philip Wexler, Barry Adam, Gregory Baum, Ioan Davies, Rick Gruneau, Barb Marshall, William Leiss, Greg Niielson, John O’Neill, Marcel Rioux, Charles Taylor, Beilharz, Johann Arnason, Bob Connell, Michael Pusey, Robert E. Young, Barry Smart, Raymond Williams, E P Thompson, Stuart Hall.

Critical theory journals

Thesis Eleven, Theory, Culture and Society, and Theory and Society.

Research design

Analytic approach:

  1. adopts a mixture of empirical and theoretical approaches to knowledge production;
  2. emphasises the scientific nature of the knowledge produced;
  3. values and departs from theory about underlying structures;
  4. draws distinction between false consciousness and liberatory consciousness and tries to reveal the latter via processes of probing and deeper analysis;
  5. seeks to expose or reveal the social and historical contingency of knowledge and practices previously accepted as natural, inevitable or inviolable;
  6. seeks to reveal injustice;
  7. focuses upon relations of domination and resistance;
  8. avoids ‘rape model’ of research in which researchers advance their careers on the basis of alienating and exploitative methods;
  9. concerned that theory should both resonate with and challenge lived experience;
  10. involves participants in knowledge construction and validation;
  11. aims for a research process in which both researcher and researched become ‘the changer and the changed’.

References used in the development of this resource

Audi, R (editor) 1999, Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Blaikie, N 1993, Approaches to social enquiry, Polity Press, Cambridge (pages 58-62).

Crotty, M 1998, The Foundations of Social Research, Allen and Unwin, Sydney. E-book at: http://etitle.title.com.au/Openlib/libview.asp?SID=62&CID=296&FID=1&PID=1&sp=1

Lather, P 2006, ‘Paradigm proliferation as a good thing to think with: teaching research in education as a wild profusion, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 35-57.

Lather, P 1986, ‘Research as praxis’, Harvard Educational Review, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 257-277.

Mansfield, N 2000, Subjectivity: Theories of the self from Freud to Haraway, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.

Morrow, RA and Brown, DD 1994, Critical theory and methodology: contemporary social theory, Sage, London.

Neuman, W 2000, Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches, Fourth edition, Allyn and Bacon, Boston.

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2007, 'Social structure', viewed April 24 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/Social_structure.


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Discussion 4 - Critical approaches

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